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Summary
Although U.S. intelligence agencies have not identified any terrorist acts
targeting agricultural production (i.e., agroterrorism) in the United States to date, the
events of September 11, 2001 have awakened the nation to their possibility.  Some
experts estimate that a single agroterrorist attack using a highly contagious livestock
disease could cost between $10 billion and $30 billion to the U.S. economy.  Experts
also recognize weaknesses in the ability of most nations to prevent and contain a
biological attack on their agricultural resources.  Limited inspection capabilities, lack
of rapid diagnostic tools, inadequate coordination between inspection agencies, and
little biosafety training of farmers, agronomists, and veterinarians are among the
recognized weaknesses.
The goal of agroterrorism is to cripple the biological infrastructure of a nation’s
agriculture, i.e., its livestock and its crops.  Many links in the agricultural production
chain are potentially susceptible to attack with a biological weapon. Traditionally the
first defense against the introduction of livestock or plant diseases has been to try to
keep them out of the country by stopping them at our borders.  However, if an
agroterrorist attack were to occur, keeping the disease from inflicting significant
economic damage will depend on quick actions from alert and informed farmers and
disease specialists.  
Congress and the Administration are engaged in discussions to protect
agricultural production from a terrorist attack, to promote greater awareness and
rapid response.  In the aftermath of September 11, the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) has gained a seat at the new Office of Homeland Security and
has increased the number of inspectors at ports-of-entry. 
In Congress, as of December 2001, fifteen proposals address agroterrorism
prevention by:
! Upgrading USDA and state research laboratories to handle new emerging
diseases and increase diagnostic capacity;
! Strengthening security around research laboratories that handle hazardous
pathogens;
! Supporting federal, state and private research that addresses prevention,
detection, and control of agroterrorist attacks; and
! Improving federal inspection procedures and interagency coordination at ports-
of-entry.
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Introduction
People more generally associate the idea of bioterrorism with outbreaks of
human illness, rather than with animal or plant destruction, or with economic loss and
market disruption.  However, the potential use of terrorism against agricultural targets
(i.e., agroterrorism) has increasingly captured the attention of national security
analysts, especially after the end of the Cold War.  Until recently, the use of biological
weapons by terrorists was regarded largely in theoretical terms, because their use was
thought improbable without the technical assistance of one of a handful rogue states.
The events of September 11, 2001, and the deadly anthrax attacks which followed,
have brought bioterrorism into the realm of possibility. 
Attacks against agriculture are as old as war itself.  In modern warfare practice,
however, the use of biological weapons against agricultural targets has remained
mostly a theoretical consideration.  In fact, biological weapons have rarely been used
against crops or livestock despite extensive research devoted to this possibility in the
past – particularly during World War II and the immediate aftermath, when several
countries, including the United States, developed crop and livestock diseases as
weapons of mass destruction.  With the ratification of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention1 in 1972, the United States stopped military development of
biological weapons and destroyed stockpiles over the following decades. 
 
Even though there have been no reported attacks to crops or livestock  few
government agencies or private sector enterprises are taking the prospect for granted
since September 11.  For example, a report by the Gilmore Commission on terrorism
noted that “... a biological attack against an agricultural target offers terrorists a
virtually risk-free form of assault, which has a high probability of success and which
also has the prospect of obtaining political objectives, such as undermining confidence
in the ability of government or giving the terrorists an improved bargaining position.”2
The potential for economic damage from an agroterrorist attack depends on a
number of factors, such as its geographical spread, the disease agent, the location of
the attack, how long it remains undetected, and its economic target.  Cost estimates
vary accordingly.  For example, a 1999 University of California study estimated that
the cost of a foot and mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in that state could range
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3  Ekboir, J.M. 1999.  Potential impact of foot-and-mouth disease in California.  Agricultural
Issues Center.  University of California.  v, 80p.
between $6.6 and  $13.5 billion, depending on the severity of different scenarios.3
USDA officials estimate that a single agroterrorist attack on the livestock industry
using a highly infective agent, for example, could cost the U.S. economy between $10
billion and $30 billion.  The country is not alone in being vulnerable to attack.
Experts recognize weaknesses in the ability of most nations to prevent or cope with
biological attacks on their agricultural production.  Limited border inspection
capabilities, absence of rapid detection and diagnostic tools, lack of vaccines or
control techniques, poor  coordination between border inspection agencies, and poor
biosafety training of farmers, agronomists, veterinary corps and regulators are among
the reported weaknesses.  
At the same time, U.S. agriculture’s response to accidental and naturally
occurring agricultural threats over the past 10 years, observers note, has already
established a solid base on which to build defenses against any deliberate introduction
of a plant or animal pathogen.  The 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom,
France and in the Netherlands has placed federal, state and local authorities in the
highest state of alert seen in decades.  To guard against th accidental entry of FMD,
for example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) added hundreds of new
inspectors at ports of entry, and engaged in an aggressive public awareness campaign
about travel to and from FMD countries.  State and local government officials have
tightened disease surveillance networks and the physical security of biological
resources (such as animal disease research labs) that could be at risk.  Biosecurity is
a priority interest among farmers, food manufacturers and retailers nationwide.  They
may be the first line of defense against an act agroterrorism.
This report examines the potential threats to America’s agriculture from a
deliberate biological attack, describes the current defense structure and capabilities
available to respond to agroterrorism, and analyzes current congressional proposals
to address the threat of biological weapons to U.S. agriculture.
Economic Impacts
The goal of agroterrorism would be to damage a nation’s livestock and its crops.
Consequences of such an attack could be felt in two ways: 
! Direct economic losses resulting from lost production, the cost of destroying
disease-ridden crops and livestock, and the cost of disease containment
measures, such as drugs, diagnostics, vaccines, pesticides and veterinary
services.  For example, conservative cost and loss estimates from the 1983
U.S. outbreak of avian influenza show eradication costs of $70 million and
market losses of $350 million for the U.S. poultry industry; and
! Indirect costs and  multiplier effects from dislocations in agricultural sectors
dependent on agriculture (feed and inputs industry, transportation, retail) and
from the loss of export markets (as trading partners exercise their rights to
quarantine or embargo targeted U.S. agricultural products under various trade
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agreements).  In the UK, for instance, the recent outbreaks of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or ‘mad cow’ disease) and FMD have had
a combined cost to government of $17 billion in compensation paid to farmers,
laid-off livestock and related industry  employees, and export market loss.  
Scale of Impacts.  Livestock production is the single largest segment of U.S.
agriculture with populations of over one billion poultry, 100 million cattle, 60 million
hogs and pigs, and 7 million sheep.  According to the USDA Economic Research
Service, domestic U.S. meat and dairy sales surpassed $70 billion in 2000, and
represent over half of U.S. agricultural output.  In 2000, the United States sold $2.9
billion in beef and veal, $1.2 billion in fresh or frozen pork, and $1 billion in dairy
products to trading partners.  Four countries buy 95% of U.S. beef exports.  Japan
is the principal buyer ($1.1 billion), followed by Mexico ($533 million), Korea ($398
million), and Canada ($253 million).  Similarly, Japan ($588 million), Mexico ($302
million) and Canada ($138 million) are the largest buyers of U.S. pork.   
Domestic production in wheat, corn, soybeans, feed grains, and rice covers more
than 200 million acres with total sales surpassing $37 billion in 2000.   In 2000,  U.S.
exports of grains and feeds, oilseeds, fruits and vegetables were $26.6 billion. 
If an FMD outbreak occurred in the United States every livestock-related
agricultural sector would feel the impact.  According to industry officials, every other
bushel of U.S. grain goes to animal feed.  A significant drop in demand for feed
(caused by extensive cattle and swine herd depopulation) could further depress grain
prices, currently at historically low levels.  Conversely, any attack on grain production
could reduce supply, drastically increase grain imports and, consequently elevate feed
and food prices.  Agricultural input industries (e.g., veterinary medicines,
agrochemicals), and marketing and distribution segments (e.g., stockyards, packers,
distributors, and retailers) could be negatively impacted by an outbreak, as well.  The
American Farm Bureau Federation reports that an FMD outbreak in the United States
could cost nearly $12 billion just to deal with the direct consequences of the crisis.
USDA officials generally agree with the magnitude of this estimate.  
The psychological impact on the general public of an agroterrorist attack would
also have economic consequences.  Dr. Roger Breeze, of the USDA’s Agriculture
Research Service (ARS)4, says the fact that the United States has not experienced a
major cattle or sheep epidemic in the era of television is extremely important in this
regard, as it effectively means that “no visual point of reference has been available to
prepare the public for the consequences of containing such an occurrence.” 
The Targets of Agroterrorism
Why is agriculture an attractive target?  On October 27, 1999,  Dr. Floyd
Horn, USDA/ARS Administrator, testified before the Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats of the Senate Armed Services Committee that American agriculture is “...by
virtue of its efficiency and its trends toward concentration, vulnerable to an
agricultural bioterrorism incident.”  According to Dr. Horn, the current poor state of
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preferred course of  action because tests designed to differentiate vaccinated animals and silent
carriers do not exist.  Thus trade rules will allow resumption of exports from a non-
vaccinating country quicker than from a country that has not resorted to mass vaccinations.
U.S. rapid detection capabilities offers an agroterrorist a great potential for a surprise
biological attack to agriculture.  The following reasons are given by experts to
potentially explain why agriculture may be an attractive target of terrorism: 
! There are many more lethal and highly contagious biological agents affecting
animals than there are affecting humans.  In addition, these diseases, such as
FMD, are usually not harmful to the terrorists or saboteurs themselves.
Terrorists seeking to sabotage an agricultural commodity can select among
several economically valuable targets, match the target crop/livestock against
a published list of diseases, and select the most accessible to their means.
Finally, many of these diseases appear to be environmentally resilient and are
reasonably easy to acquire, produce and deploy;
! The intensive way in which U.S. livestock and crops are currently grown, bred,
and transported has largely circumvented natural barriers that could slow
pathogenic dissemination.  The modern structure of concentrated livestock
industries separates breeding from finishing operations, uses highly genetically
homogeneous livestock and crops, and requires large-scale geographical
movements of animals in short order to satisfy production demands; 
! The mere presence, or even the rumor, of an “internationally quarantineable”
pest or disease would in all likelihood stop all exports of that commodity from
the United States, and have a significant effect on the economy.  Likewise, a
state of heightened ‘awareness’ or security would force expenditures on
farmers that could raise costs of production; and
! Success in keeping livestock diseases out of the United States, sometimes for
many decades, means that many producers and veterinarians lack the expertise
needed to quickly recognize their symptoms in case of an outbreak.  In
addition, the fact that livestock are not usually vaccinated against these
diseases means that animals may be susceptible, and sufficient vaccine stocks
may not be available in case of an outbreak.5
Livestock vs. Crop Targets.  A widely accepted view among scientists is
that livestock herds are much more susceptible to agroterrorism  than crop plants.
Much of this has to do with the success of efforts to systematically eliminate animal
diseases, such as FMD and classical swine fever, from U.S. herds.  In contrast, a
number of plant pathogens continue to exist in small areas of the United States or
continue to infect small numbers of plants each year, making outbreaks and their
control something of a routine.  Moreover, plant pathogens are much more technically
difficult to manipulate.  A would-be terrorist would be unlikely to overcome the
myriad biological conditions needed that would make plant pathogens grow and
prosper.  Plant pathologists state that even a skilled practitioner, in trying to create
disease in a field, frequently finds the natural environment somewhat uncooperative.
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technical and trade related information.  
7  Nipah virus is a new disease of pigs discovered in the Malaysian peninsula in October 1998.
It has led to the death, by encephalitis, of more than one hundred people who had come into
contact with infected pigs. The ‘Nipah’ virus was identified as the etiological agent.
Serological tests indicated that a fruit-eating bat of the Pteropid genus could be the reservoir.
More than one million infected or exposed pigs have been slaughtered and movements of other
animals living in the infected zone were suspended. 
8  ‘Biosafety levels,’ or “BL” give guidance to researchers about the potential risk of
pathogens contained within laboratories.  BL-1 laboratories handle pathogens of minimal
hazzard to humans or the environment; while BL-4 laboratories handle dangerous agents with
a high risk of aerosol-transmission to humans, and life-threatening diseases. 
The Threats.  Experts also agree that of the hundreds of pathogens and insect
pests available to an agroterrorist, perhaps fewer than a couple of dozen represent
significant economic threats.  What determines this level of threat is the agent’s
contagiousness and potential for rapid spread, and its international status as a
“reportable” pest or disease (i.e., subject to international quarantine).  For example,
widespread animal diseases like brucellosis, influenza and tuberculosis receive less
international attention than diseases such as FMD, hog cholera, or Newcastle in
poultry.  These latter diseases are recognized by the International Office for
Epizootics (OIE)6 as part of “List A” diseases, which consists of  the most feared
livestock diseases worldwide (See Table 1).  The OIE also keeps a “List B” which
lists actionable (i.e., quarantineable) diseases but ranks them as lower threats to
animal health or trade.  List  “B” also contains well known livestock diseases, such
as anthrax; and emerging diseases, such as Nipah virus7,  which according to some
specialists could be elevated to List “A” in the future. 
In addition, new animal diseases are emerging around the world that need
scientific attention.  Of most concern are so-called “zoonotic” diseases, capable of
infecting humans as well as animals.  Some can be lethal and no vaccine or other
protection is currently available against them. Examples include Hendra virus, Nipah
virus, and the highly pathogenic avian influenza virus strain H5N1 that appeared in
Hong Kong in 1997.  There are currently no animal research facilities equipped to
study  these diseases in the United States.  Animal research on these diseases would
require additional biosafety protections to safeguard the researcher’s health, such as
biosafety level-4 facilities (BL-4).8  
Unlike the situation with livestock, there is no agreed-upon list of plant
pathogens or insects most likely to be used by terrorists, or even of agents likely to
do the most damage to American agriculture.  USDA regulates and lists hundreds of
actionable foreign plant diseases and insect pests.   Experts  have identified some
pathogens that could be used by terrorists.  Among them are wheat rust and soybean
rust, which is a fungal disease that is not known to exist in the continental United
States, but common in other countries.  Wheat rust has been “weaponized” in some
countries, and there is some concern that the same could be done with soy bean rust.
Other potential plant pathogens that could be used to cause economic damage include
citrus greening, citrus canker, Karnal bunt, Philippine downy mildew, citrus black
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live Mediterranean fruit fly larvae were  found in Spanish clementines in Louisiana, Maryland
and North Carolina. 
10  Biosecurity is commonly defined as:  (1) the use of  farm management practices that
protect animals and crops from the introduction of infectious agents; and (2) the rapid
containment of a disease that prevents its  spread within a herd or flock, or to other farms.
spot, rice bacterial leaf streak, rice blast, and potato wart.  Insect threats number in
the hundreds, but fruit flies (including Mediterranean fruitfly) and various insects that
spread specific plant diseases are at the top of the list.9  
Defenses Against the Threat of Agroterrorism  
Every link in the agricultural production chain is susceptible to attack with a
biological weapon. Traditionally the first defense against the introduction of livestock
or plant diseases has been to try to keep them out.  Agricultural quarantine inspectors
at pre-clearance inspections at ports of embarkation and at the U.S. borders are the
first line of defense.
However, if a foreign disease were introduced, the second line of defense lies
with farmers, producers, veterinarians, plant pathologists and entomologists. Most
agree that effectiveness depends on a heightened sense of awareness, and on the
ability to rapidly determine the level of threat (e.g., like having rapid disease
diagnostic tools).  Lessons from disease outbreaks, including the recent FMD
outbreaks in Europe, show that the speed of detection, diagnosis, and control spell
the difference between an isolated incident and an economic disaster.  In an outbreak,
economic damage is proportional to the time it takes to first detect the disease.
Clearly, if there is a delay in diagnosis, and an epidemic is allowed to get a foothold,
then one farm’s problem may become everyone’s nightmare.  
Another line of defense is biosecurity10, or the use of preventive measures on the
farm, as an integral part of agricultural production systems.  New attitudes are now
evident in farm country.  Most farm specialists agree that livestock farmers are
increasingly aware of the importance of biosecurity measures, particularly since the
FMD outbreaks in Europe.  Signs of “Biosecure Area” on fences and barns are now
common sights, and more farm operators are requiring visitors to wear boot covers
to guard against bringing in disease. 
Farm organizations, such as the Farm Bureau, and USDA are urging farmers and
ranchers to take extra precautions in allowing people to come onto their property.
Among the common precautions are: (1) not to allow visitors on the farm; (2) clean
up between groups of livestock; (3) monitor animals for signs of disease; (4) isolate
all new herd introductions for signs of disease; and (5) use of perimeter fences to keep
vehicles off the farm.  According to Dr.  Phillip Clauer, of Pennsylvania State
University,  the use of modern biosecurity measures had its roots in the 1980's when
outbreaks of avian influenza forced industry to look at how to eliminate vulnerabilities
to this disease.  Most experts agree that while biosecurity measures have been a
standard feature of contract poultry and swine operations for over a decade, some 
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Table 1. List “A” of  Animal Diseases from the World Health Organization’s “Office
International Des Epizooties” 
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farmers, especially in smaller non-contract operations, are just learning about the need
for and costs of adopting these measures.
Finally, the last line of defense, and the costliest, is the isolation, control and
eradication of an epidemic.  The more geographically widespread a disease outbreak,
the costlier and more drastic the control measures may have to be.  Valuable models
come from current agricultural disease outbreaks, such as FMD in the UK,  citrus
canker epidemic in Florida, and Karnal bunt of wheat in Texas.  Each one of these
epidemics has required the depopulation and destruction of livestock (FMD) and
crops in quarantine areas, indemnity payments to farmers and growers, and immediate
suspension of trade.  In addition, actions taken in each of these outbreaks have met
with varying degrees of resistance from groups opposed to mass slaughter of animals,
or from farmers who fear the loss of their livelihood. Further, canker eradication
efforts in Florida neighborhoods illustrate how science-based measures have been
challenged and delayed in courts of justice, or  how farmers may show reluctance to
voluntarily test their wheat fields for Karnal bunt, or sheep herds for scrapie.  It seems
clear that of all lines of defense, this one is the most politically sensitive and difficult.
USDA Agencies. Federal responsibilities to protect against acts of
agroterrorism fall primarily with USDA agencies.  Primary authority to protect
agriculture and assure the safety of meat, poultry, and egg products is given to
USDA’s  Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Food Safety
Inspection Agency (FSIS), while the Agricultural Research Service conducts research
and development of countermeasures and diagnostic tools.  Overall coordination of
emergency actions in case of an accidental introduction or deliberate attack rests with
the newly created Office of Crisis Planning and Management (OCPM).  
OCPM.  The Office of Crisis Planning and Management is a department-level
office under the Assistant Secretary for Administration. The office is responsible for
coordinating activities on terrorism across USDA and with other federal agencies,
including FEMA. The office also coordinates USDA’s role in the Federal Response
Plan, under the Office for Homeland Security.
APHIS.  The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service is responsible for
protecting U.S. agriculture from foreign pests and diseases.  Serving as the first line
of defense to prevent pest and disease agents from entering the United States, this
agency is charged with inspections of aircraft, ships, cargo, passengers and baggage
at U.S. ports of entry.  Funding for inspections comes primarily through the collection
of Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) user fees.  AQI fees were authorized
under §2509(a) of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990 (21
USC 136a).   
APHIS is also responsible for establishing quarantines, controlling the interstate
commerce of regulated articles, and directing and coordinating eradication efforts
with state and federal agencies inside areas of quarantine.  APHIS has 2,700
inspectors at 125 ports of entry around the country.  The number of inspectors per
state is determined by APHIS risk analysis factors such as volumes of cargo and
passengers, and the potential for importation of known threats (see Table 2).
Currently, there are 486 veterinarians in APHIS, serving in 45 Veterinary Services
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(VS) area offices in the United States and its possessions.  Close to 75% of these
veterinarians (350) are certified as Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians.
Table 2.  Top Five States Ranked by Number of APHIS
Inspection Ports and Personnel 





New York 5 242
APHIS is also the agency that monitors foreign animal and plant health, and it
maintains an intensive surveillance system aimed at rapidly detecting and diagnosing
outbreaks of exotic diseases in the United States. The staff is assisted in its efforts by
other federal and state field veterinarians, animal and plant health technicians, and
disease specialists.  APHIS operates two foreign animal disease diagnostic
laboratories in the United States: the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, Greenport,
NY; and the National Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory in Ames, Iowa (APHIS
operates the Ames lab jointly with ARS).   Diagnosis for most OIE List “A” diseases
are performed at Plum Island, which by nature of its isolation and its biosafety level-3
facility is suited to deal with these dangerous diseases.  Plant pathogen and insect
samples are handled at diagnostic facilities in Riverdale, Maryland.  Diagnosis of these
plant pests is done in collaboration with ARS taxonomists and with specialists at land-
grant universities. 
FSIS.   USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service plays an important role in
detecting livestock disease within the borders of the United States.  The agency is
responsible for the mandatory inspection of meat, poultry, and processed egg
products to ensure their safety, wholesomeness, and proper labeling.  FSIS’
Veterinary Medical Officer (VMOs) corps and inspectors conduct ante-mortem
inspections on each animal slaughtered in the United States, keeping watch on unusual
symptoms  related to disease such as FMD or ‘mad cow’ disease. FSIS cooperates
with APHIS in conducting disease surveillance.  In the event of a suspicious symptom
or disease, FSIS VMOs are instructed to notify APHIS.  Of about 7,600 of FSIS’
employees, roughly 1,120 of them are VMOs.  FSIS inspects some 6,200 meat and
poultry slaughter plants and import stations nationwide.  The United States accepts
meat and poultry imports only from foreign countries that FSIS has certified as having
inspection systems at least equal to the U.S. system, and then only from plants on an
approved list.  FSIS personnel conduct some foreign plant reviews. 
ARS.  The Agricultural Research Service is USDA’s  in-house research agency.
About 30% of ARS’ $1 billion budget is dedicated to research in support of USDA’s
regulatory agencies.  Among other things, ARS researches state-of-the art disease
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an FMD outbreak, would be additional.
diagnostic tools and animal vaccines.  The service also works closely with other
federal agencies, universities and private sector companies to develop these
technologies though grants and Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
(CRADA). Congress authorized CRADAs in the Federal Technology Transfer Act
of 1986 (P.L. 99-502) to enhance the ability of federal research laboratories to work
with industry to commercialize technology.  This act and various other federal
laws—including the Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-480) and the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-517)—make the transfer of new technology to the private sector
and industry a responsibility of all federal research agencies.  Currently, there are
nearly 230 active CRADAs, of which three are related to animal disease diagnostics
or vaccines.
Federal Authorities.  In the event of finding a foreign animal disease such as
foot-and-mouth disease, whether accidentally or intentionally introduced,  the
Secretary of Agriculture has broad authority to eradicate it.  The Secretary, for
example may stop importation of animals and animal products from suspected
countries (21 USC §§101 and 111), as Secretary Veneman did during the 2001 FMD
outbreaks in the EU.  Further, if an animal disease outbreak is found in the United
States, the Secretary is authorized, among other things, to:
! Stop U.S. animal exports (21 USC §113), and interstate transport of diseased
animals (21 USC §115); 
! Impose quarantines on any state or territory (21 USC §123);
! Seize and dispose of infected livestock and prevent dissemination of the
disease (21 USC §134a); 
! Declare an extraordinary emergency on confirmation of a foreign animal
disease diagnosis (21USC §134a); 
! Compensate owners for the fair market value of animals destroyed by the
Secretary’s orders (21 USC §134a(d); and 
! Transfer the necessary funding from USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation
to cover costs of eradication and quarantine operations (7 USC §147b).11  
The exact nature of control and eradication operations is difficult to predict.
Past experience and simulations have shown that day-to-day decisions would be made
using tools such as “decision trees” that include factors such as geographical spread,
rates of infestation, available professional and field personnel, public sentiment, and
industry cooperation.  Similar authorities would cover attacks on crops (7 USC
§§7701-7772).
Agroterrorism-related Obligations in USDA.  According to the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), USDA receives little funding specifically
earmarked for activities related to agroterrorism.   In FY2001 for example, APHIS
reported obligations of $150,000 to develop educational materials and training
programs dealing with bioterrorism.  For its part, ARS obligated  $500,000 in FY
2001 to work on a system to improve on-site rapid detection of biological agents in
animals, plants, and food and in cooperation with the Department of Defense and  the
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Department of Health and Human Services.12   In addition, APHIS, FSIS, and ARS
conduct activities that enhance their capacity to protect against threats to agriculture
similar to those posed by agroterrorism (e.g., protecting against accidental
introduction of pests and diseases).  According to a recent report from the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), USDA-ARS obligated $36.1 million in FY2000 for
research on defenses against weapons of mass destruction  and APHIS obligated $1.2
million on preparedness and  response to a WMD attack.  Differences in accounting
of activities towards defense may account for the discrepancy in numbers between
CBO and OMB reports.
The Federal Response Before and After September 11 
USDA’s Role in National Security. The terrorist attacks of September 11
have accelerated debates by national security analysts on ways to integrate USDA into
homeland security protection schemes.   Within USDA, however, this debate has been
ongoing since 1988, when President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12656
which required all federal agencies to develop preparedness planning for national
security emergencies.  Later, in 1998, Presidential  Decision Directive (PDD) 62 gave
USDA a seat at the table in the newly created Office of the National Coordinator for
Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism.  USDA was also made a
participant in the development of  a Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) for
essential operations by PDD-67.  This Clinton-era document required all federal
agencies to develop plans to ensure the continuity of Constitutional Government in
the event of an attack.  More recently, in the aftermath of September 11, USDA has
gained a seat on the National Security Council’s Weapons of Mass Destruction
Preparedness Group, and at the new Office of Homeland Security, which coordinates
46 federal agencies that share responsibility for protecting American citizens in case
of attack. 
Bioterrorism-related Appropriations in the Aftermath.   In October
2001, President Bush proposed an allocation of $45.2 million to USDA as part of a
$20 billion submission to Congress for emergency funding to strengthen essential
programs and services related to terrorism.  According to USDA, this funding would
support:  
! Enhanced security for facilities ($17.2 million); 
! Design and construction of a satellite facility at USDA laboratory in Ames,
Iowa for research activities ($14.1 million); 
! Technical assistance to state, local, federal, and private sector entities to
improve biosecurity ($5 million); and
! Education and training initiatives to strengthen response to potential food
supply threats, improve data collection and dissemination, and other
biosecurity activities ($8.9 million). 
The President’s proposal is being considered by Congress as part of the FY2002
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations (see “Legislation” section –H.R.3338).  In
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addition, earlier this year USDA began an extensive program review, in light of the
devastating outbreak of FMD in Europe; and APHIS received $5 million from the
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-20) to cover salaries and
expenses incurred during the FMD scare.  The administration requested $35 million
for hiring additional border inspectors and veterinarians, for contingency planning, and
for disease detection technology research. APHIS currently is increasing the
inspection staff at U.S. ports of entry by 350 (for a total of about 3000 inspectors),
and is adding 20 veterinarians to agricultural quarantine inspection  programs.
According to USDA, by the end of FY 2002, APHIS will have increased its
inspection personnel at ports of entry by nearly 40%. APHIS also is stepping up
smuggling interdiction activities and making $1.8 million in grants available to 32
states, specifically to help them plan their response to potential foreign animal disease
outbreaks.
Issues and Options in Congress
While intelligence agencies have not discovered specific terrorist threats to
agriculture to date, experts recognize weaknesses nonetheless and identify the
following corrective actions:
Strengthening Security at Research Laboratories.  The use of domestic
airliners as weapons against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has served as
a chilling reminder of the cost-effectiveness of using the nation’s resources against
itself.  Similar vulnerabilities may exist in U.S. agriculture’s peacetime research
infrastructure.  Security analyses, such as those presented by the Gilmore
Commission, have shown that security standards for protecting hazardous biological
materials at the nation’s public and private research laboratories vary widely from
facility to facility.  The situation may pose a potential opportunity for terrorists
seeking to acquire lethal agents. Concerns stemming from the recent anthrax incidents
have also heightened awareness about: (1) tightening pathogen inventory procedures,
and (2) about restricting personnel access in some laboratories.  While concerns
revolve mainly around security at university and private laboratories, some are also
calling for tighter security at USDA laboratories.  
Currently, there are no consistent minimum safety protocols or security standards
for animal research laboratories in the United States.  To address this situation, some
in Congress have proposed funding biosafety need assessment studies at states for
laboratories under their jurisdiction.  Others would like to see USDA taking the lead
in developing minimum guidelines for laboratory safety and biosecurity. While support
for these measures appears widespread, some in the research community are
apprehensive about the cost of extensive regulations on laboratories beyond the
expense of current laboratory safety procedures. According to USDA officials
interviewed for this report, additional funding may also be required to help USDA to
fulfill its obligations under PDD-67 ( i.e., ensure continuity of operations under an
attack to the nation), and to develop its liaison functions with the new Homeland
Security Office. 
Updating USDA Research Facilities.  For years, groups such as the
American Veterinary Medical Association, the United States Animal Health
Association, and other organizations like the American Farm Bureau Federation have
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argued for the need to fix and update deteriorating foreign animal disease research
and diagnostic facilities at USDA.  
USDA has acknowledged the poor state of repairs of these facilities, especially
in Ames, Iowa, and also for the need to expand and upgrade facilities at Plum Island,
NY. By law, Plum Island is the only place in the United States where, unless the
Secretary determines otherwise, research on diseases such as FMD and rinderpest
(and traditionally other “List A” diseases) is allowed (see 21 USC §135).   Proposals
in Congress would modernize and expand the current Biosafety Level 3 (BL-3)
facility at Plum Island.  
Another more controversial proposal for Plum Island calls for the construction
of a Biosafety Level 4 facility.  Such a facility would allow work with animal diseases
that affect humans, such as the deadly Hendra and Nipah viruses.  Biosafety Level 4,
the highest safety classification, entails the most stringent safety precautions that
requires researchers to wear protective suits when working in sealed laboratories.  For
years, similar proposals have met strong local opposition and a lack of support from
members of the New York Congressional delegation. There are currently two BL-4
laboratories in the United States, one at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention in Atlanta, GA, and another at the Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Frederick, MD.  USDA officials have argued
for the need of  a BL-4 research facility to keep abreast of new and emerging disease
threats, be that at Plum Island or at some other location within the United States.
Conducting animal research at existing BL-4 facilities or at foreign locations has yet
to be explored as an option.  
There is also support in Congress for increased funding for the Southeast Poultry
Disease Research Laboratory in Athens, GA, (research in Newcastle, avian influenza),
and the Arthropod-borne Animal Diseases Research Laboratory in Laramie, Wyoming
(research on bluetongue, vesicular stomatitis, plague, tularemia and West Nile virus).
These USDA facilities would need refurbishing to expand research into emerging
poultry or vector-borne diseases.
Supporting Research in Agricultural Biosecurity.  In many ways,
research that addresses prevention, detection and response to accidental introductions
of diseases also helps in the event of  an agroterrorist attack.  Experts suggest that
regulatory agencies, such as APHIS or FSIS, are in need of: (1) new technologies to
help detect diseases at ports of entry; (2) rapid and inexpensive diagnostic tests that
can quickly tell the difference between deadly pathogens or common diseases; (3)
effective synthetic animal vaccines or disease-resistant plant varieties that could be
used to suppress outbreaks or epidemics. 
Recent scientific advances, especially in the private sector, have revolutionized
disease epidemiology research with the development rapid diagnostic technologies
(like ELISA or PCR)13 with new synthetic vaccines, and with resistant biotech plant
varieties.  In fact, private research investment in the field of veterinary diagnostics,
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medicines, and biotechnology is at an all time high, and has surpassed public
investment in agricultural research  for over a decade.  Still, economic and technical
obstacles may make it difficult for U.S. private sector companies to enter into
research and development of animal vaccines and diagnostics.  For example, between
1990 and 2001, only 6 patents have been awarded for foot-and-mouth disease
vaccines or diagnostic techniques worldwide.  Of these, three are USDA patents, one
from the government of Japan, and two belong to a small U.S. company in New
York.  
According to an official at the above-mentioned U.S. company, the decision to
enter the market is risky and seldom profitable.  Lack of tax or revenue incentives for
developing products to satisfy relatively  small markets (i.e., rare diseases), and the
widely accepted policy of not vaccinating against FMD are seen as key obstacles.14
Technical hurdles, such as those imposed by being unable to conduct efficacy testing
for new diagnostics or vaccines at facilities other than at Plum Island are also cited.
According to industry officials, cooperation between USDA and private sector
companies to develop new products is minimal, and more cooperation would be
welcome.  According to USDA, there are three active CRADAs (out of  227) that
deal with animal diagnostic/vaccine development between USDA and private sector
entities (one is with a South African entity).  
  
According to USDA, the Agricultural Research Service is currently conducting
86 animal health-related research projects ($88.9 million) in FY2001, including
research on detection,  diagnosis, and vaccines work in OIE ‘List A’ diseases like
FMD.  Other active research programs on animal diseases include projects on
brucellosis, mad cow disease, bovine tuberculosis, chronic wasting disease, Johne’s
disease,  porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), swine
influenza virus (SIV), and porcine respiratory coronavirus, and poultry diseases such
as HPAI, Newcastle and Salmonella.  
Extramural research, which constitutes about 30% of USDA research portfolio,
is coordinated by the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service
(CSREES). CSREES is the agency within USDA that distributes annual federal
appropriations to the states in partial support of their research, extension, and
academic programs.  In addition to formula funds to land grant colleges and other
universities, CSREES administers research grant programs such as the National
Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program (NRI) and the Special Grants
program (almost exclusively earmarked grants to specific land grant institutions).   In
FY 2001, CSREES awarded 36 NRI grants for animal health projects ($6.4 million),
and funded 7 animal health-related Special Grants ($3.8 million).  
Improving Federal Inspection and Interagency Coordination.
According to analysts, the new responsibilities of USDA within the Office of
Homeland Security will require stronger coordination of its intra- and
interdepartmental operations.  Concerns about deficiencies in communication between
USDA inspection agencies (APHIS and FSIS) were heightened by recent reports of
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lax record-keeping and control procedures during the recent foot-and-mouth disease
scare.  The lack of adequate communication between agencies in USDA is not a new
issue nor is it confined to this agency.   Experts have proposed the creation of an
integrated, automated record-keeping system to be used and shared across agencies.
A similar system, the Operational and Administrative System for Import Support
(OASIS), is used by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to link all inspection
offices with the brokers at U.S. port of entry where FDA-regulated products come
into the country.  Based on the information supplied by the broker, OASIS is used to
track imports and trigger inspection by FDA officials.
Another concern has been about increasing APHIS inspection capacity.  While
APHIS has in the past successfully kept out or intercepted many foreign pests and
diseases, some question the agency’s ability to respond to deliberate disease pest
attacks.  Specifically, the need for more border inspectors, and for more extensive use
of modern detection technologies are among the key recommendations cited by
critics.  Following the FMD outbreaks in the EU, the agency has increased the number
of inspectors but USDA and some industry sources would still like to see more
personnel posted, but funding is an issue.  As seen above, APHIS inspections are
primarily funded through the collection of Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI)
user fees.  The 1996 farm bill restricts APHIS from using all AQI fees it collects by
making a significant portion of this source of funding subject to the appropriations
process.  Proponents of lifting this restriction, originally set to expire in 2002, argue
that such a change would provide additional funding of close to $15 million per year
for APHIS port-of-entry operations.
Finally, some proposals are currently being considered that would consolidate
and revise the authorities of the Secretary of Agriculture relating to protection of
animal health.  These proposals would increase civil and criminal penalties for
violations, reaffirm federal preemption of quarantine laws over state statutes, and
modernize statutes to better conform to international trade agreements.  Some experts
and farm groups believe that provisions in these proposals would help APHIS fight
agroterrorist threats, but have voiced disappointment that none of these provisions
have been included in key agroterrorism bills moving in Congress.  Repeated
statements by APHIS Administrator Bobby Acord during congressional briefings
seem to indicate that the Bush Administration is not seeking new authorities at this
time, choosing instead to propose increased funding for activities under existing
authorities. 
Legislation
Several bills have been introduced in the 107th Congress that address some aspect
of terrorism in agriculture, and they are summarized below.  Some of these proposals
address agroterrorism within the broader context of homeland defense measures,
while others, such as the Senate-proposed Farm Bill (S.1731) address agroterrorism
in the context of general agricultural legislation.  As of December 19, 2001, half a
dozen bills preponderantly address agroterrorism.  A side-by-side comparison of key
provisions of these bills is presented at the end of this report. 
H.R. 3338 (Lewis).  Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002 & Emergency
Supplemental Act.  The House-passed FY 2002 Supplemental Appropriations
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(Division B) recommends an appropriation of $4.6 for emergency expenses related
to September 11 at USDA’s Office of the Secretary.  The measure also recommends
$2.9 million for buildings and facilities, The measure provides $5.6 and $8.2 million
for salaries and expenses for ARS and APHIS, respectively; and $14.1 million for
APHIS buildings and facilities.  The Senate-passed bill recommends $80.9 million for
emergency expenses for the Office of the Secretary.  The measure also provides $70
million for salaries and expenses at ARS, and $95 million for APHIS, of which $50
million may be transferred and merged with the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection
User Fee Account.  The Senate engrossed bill also proposes $73 million for ARS
buildings and facilities; and $14.1 million for APHIS.  The latter appropriations will
be used for facility upgrades at Ames, Iowa, Plum Island, N.Y., and others.  In
addition, the Senate bill offers $50 million for emergency expenses research and
education for CSREES.  Currently, the bill is in Conference.
H.R. 2795 (Nethercutt). Agroterrorism Prevention Act of 2001.  Amends the federal
criminal code to prohibit plant enterprise terrorism.  Establishes and enhances penalties
for animal and plant enterprise terrorism.  Makes animal and plant enterprise terrorism
a predicate offense under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act.  Authorizes appropriations of $5 million to the National Science Foundation
(fiscal years 2002 and 2003) for animal and plant research security programs and
grants.  Introduced August 2, 2001; referred to the Subcommittee in Crime of the
House Judiciary Committee.
H.R. 3174 (Pomeroy). Food Supply Protection Act.  Authorizes appropriations to the
Secretary of Agriculture for: (1) Department of Agriculture biosecurity initiatives
required under Presidential Decision Directive PDD-67, to be used to secure resources
and refurbish existing ARS and APHIS facilities; (2) research in support of
bioterrorism response and research.  Introduced October 25, 2001; referred to House
Agriculture Committee, Subcommittees on Livestock and Horticulture, and on
Conservation, Credit, Rural Development and Research.
H.R. 3198 (Putnam).  Agricultural Terrorism Prevention Response Act of 2001.
Directs the President to establish an Interagency Agricultural Terrorism Committee to
coordinate the counter terrorism effort to protect the U.S. agricultural production and
food supply system. Directs the Secretary of Agriculture to strengthen cooperation
with other agencies; appoint an agricultural liaison to the Homeland Security Office;
and establish an Industry Working Group on agricultural terrorism to develop
counterterrorism measures.  Establishes a Counterterrorism Policy Council to serve as
the USDA senior policy forum regarding terrorism issues.  Introduced October 31,
2001; referred to House Agriculture Committee, Subcommittee on Department
Operations, Oversight, Nutrition and Forestry.
 
H.R. 3255 (Menendez).  Bioterrorism Protection Act (BioPAct) of 2001.  This is a
broad anti-terrorism measure providing for improvements in public health
infrastructure, for enhancements to law enforcement, and for the protection of
agricultural production, food water supplies from terrorist attacks.  Title II (Sec.
201)authorizes appropriations of $220,000,000 for activities to reduce threats from
agricultural pathogens and insect pests, and for increased security of department
information systems by establishing an ‘automated record-keeping’ and tracking
system’ that is fully integrated with the FSIS.  Introduced November 8, 2001;  referred
CRS-17
to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on the
Judiciary, Transportation and Infrastructure, Armed Services, Science, Intelligence
(Permanent Select), International Relations, Agriculture, and Ways and Means.
H.R.3293 (Lucas). Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001. Authorizes
appropriations for biosecurity upgrades at specified USDA and related facilities.
Directs the Secretary of Agriculture, with respect to bioterrorism countermeasures, to:
(1) expand ARS programs to protect the domestic food supply; (2) establish a
Consortium for Countermeasures Against Agricultural Bioterrorism comprised of
institutions of higher education in partnership with federal agencies; (3) enhance the
National Research Initiative of the Competitive Grants Program to award grants
research on bioterrorism protective measures; and (4) expand the capacities of the
APHIS and FSIS.  Introduced November 14, 2001; referred to House Agriculture
Committee.
H.R.3310 (Ganske). Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001.  A bill to improve the
ability of the United States to prepare for and respond to a biological threat or attack.
Companion bill to S. 1765 (Frist).  Section 512 enhances and expands capacity of the
APHIS through the conduct of activities to protect against the introduction of plant and
animal disease organisms by terrorists.   Introduced November 16, 2001; referred to
House Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Health, and House Judiciary and
House Agriculture Committees.
S.1486 (Edwards). Biological and Chemical Weapons Preparedness Act of 2001.  A
broad based anti-terrorism bill that authorizes additional appropriations for programs
concerning; (1) vaccine, antibiotic, and therapeutic research and development; (2)
protecting the food supply (including interdiction); and (3) research by specified federal
agencies and departments.  Section 4(b) would strengthen the National Pharmaceutical
Stockpile to include animal antibiotics and vaccines among other necessary materials.
Introduced October 3, 2001; referred to Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Committee.
S. 1546 (Roberts). Directs the Secretary of the Treasury to provide funding to the
Secretary of Agriculture: (1) in FY2002 for specified bio-security initiatives, bio-safety
animal research facilities, ARS/APHIS facilities, an animal disease laboratory, and
agroterrorism rapid detection field test kits and training; and (2) in each of FY2002
through FY2011 for specified counter-bioterrorism research initiatives. Introduced
October 15, 2001; referred to Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
S. 1548 (Carnahan). Bioterrorism Awareness Act.  Requires the Director of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention to award an initial 3-year grant to create and
maintain an official federal bioterrorism information website.  The website shall contain
scientifically based information regarding how farmers and other personnel involved in
the Nation’s food supply system may protect themselves, their livestock, and the
Nation’s food supply in the case of a bioterrorist attack.  Introduced October 15, 2001;
referred to Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee.
S. 1563 (Hutchison). Agricultural Bioterrorism Countermeasures Act of 2001.
Establishes a coordinated program of science-based countermeasures to address the
threats to agricultural resources.  Directs the Secretary of Agriculture to: (1) expand
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ARS programs to protect the domestic food supply; (2) establish a Consortium for
Countermeasures Against Agricultural Bioterrorism comprised of institutions of higher
education in partnership with federal agencies to develop long-term biosecurity
programs; (3) enhance the National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program by
awarding grants for bioterrorism protective measures; and (4) expand the capacities of
the APHIS and FSIS. Introduced October 17, 2001; referred to Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry.
S.1731 (Harkin). Agriculture, Conservation, and Rural Enhancement Act of 2001.
Section 723 of the Research, Education and Extension title, would amend the  National
Agricultural Research, Extension, and Teaching Policy Act of 1977 (7 USC.  §3101 et
seq.) is amended by adding a “Biosecurity” subtitle.  Provisions authorize
appropriations of $100 million per year (FY 2003-2005) for agricultural research,
education and extension activities in biosecurity planning and response activities, and
for grants to modernize and build research facilities at eligible land grant universities or
private sector institutions.  Introduced December 14, 2001; considered by the Senate.
S.1764 (Lieberman).  Robert Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy
Nguyen, Ottilie Lundgren, and Lisa J. Raines Biological and Chemical Weapons
Research Act.  Provides federal tax incentives and credits to increase research by
commercial, for-profit entities to develop vaccines, microbicides, diagnostic
technologies, and other drugs to prevent and treat illnesses associated with a biological
or chemical weapons attack.  Establishes a Bioterrorism Countermeasure Purchase
Fund for incentives to private sector research and development of countermeasures to
respond to an attack with biological agents or toxins.  Introduced December 4, 2001;
referred to Senate Finance Committee. 
S.1765 (Frist).  Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2001.  A bill to improve the ability
of the United States to prepare for and respond to a biological threat or attack.
Companion bill to S. H.R. 3310 (Ganske).  Amends the Public Health Service Act to
provide additional authorities of the Secretary of Health and Human Services,
strengthens the Strategic National Pharmaceutical Stockpile and improves the ability of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to respond effectively to bioterrorism,
among other things.  Section 512 enhances and expands capacity of the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service through the conduct of activities to protect against the
introduction of plant and animal disease organisms by terrorists.  Introduced December
4, 2001; The measure has been read the second time, and placed on Senate Legislative
Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 255. 
S.1775 (Hutchinson).  Agroterrorism Prevention Act of 2001.  Amends the federal
criminal code to prohibit plant enterprise terrorism.  Establishes and enhances penalties
for animal and plant enterprise terrorism.   Makes animal and plant enterprise terrorism
a predicate offense under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.
Authorizes appropriations of $5 million to the National Science Foundation (fiscal years
2002 and 2003) for animal and plant research security programs and grants.  Introduced
December 5, 2001; referred to Senate Judiciary Committee.  
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Table 3. Side-by Side Comparison of Selected Bills on Agroterrorism
S.1546(Roberts)/ 
H.R.3174 (Pomeroy)
S.1765 (Frist)/  H.R.3310
(Ganske)
S.1563 (Hutchison) H.R.3198 (Putnam) H.R.3293 (Lucas)
Biosecurity Precautions
and  Standards
H.R. 3174  authorizes $101.2
m i l l i o n   ( F Y 2 0 0 2 )
appropriations,  while S.1546
authorizes the  same amount
from  unappropriated
treasury funds.  Funds are to
be used by USDA for
biosecurity init iatives
required under Presidential
Directive 67, and to expand
security at existing facilities
of in ARS  and APHIS. 
Authorizes $20 million in
FY2002 and such funds as
necessary in subsequent





agents; (b) toward grants for
land grant universities for
b i o s e c u r i t y  n e e d s




Establish a national protocol
for screening individuals who
require access to agricultural
research facilities in a
manner that provides for the
protection of personal
privacy.
No Provisions No Provisions Authorizes appropriations for
USDA/ARS for compliance
of biosecurity responsibilities





S.1765 (Frist)/  H.R.3310
(Ganske)
S.1563 (Hutchison) H.R.3198 (Putnam) H.R.3293 (Lucas)
Facility Enhancements at
USDA 
Authorizes in FY2002: from
appropriations (HR 3174) or
from unappropriated treasury
funds (S.1546):
$129 million for renovation
research  facilities, plus $105
million for a new Biosafety
Level 4 facility at Plum
Island Animal Disease
Center, NY.
$381 million to update of
ARS and APHIS facilities in
Ames, Iowa.
$78.5 million for planning
and design of an ARS facility
in Athens, Ga.
$29.8 million for renovation
of the Laramie, Wyoming
ARS facility.
H.R.3310 - For FY2002,
authorizes $180 million for
b u i l d i n g  u p g r a d e s ,
renovations in ARS/APHIS
laboratories in Plum Island,
and  NY; Ames, IA; design of
bio-containment laboratory
for poultry research in




S. 1765-  Same as Ganske’s
except that it specifies
amounts for Plum Island
($100 million) and Ames
($80 million), and adds
authority for funding in
FY2003-2006 for the design
of bio-containment laboratory
for poultry in Athens, GA;
and renovation of  the
Animal Disease Laboratory
in Laramie,  WY. 
No Provisions Calls for establishing a
biosafety Level 4 facility at
the Plum Island Animal
Disease Center, (NY) for
animal studies on human-
animal pathogens (e.g.,
Nipah  v i rus ,  Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza




$220 million for renovation
of expansion of the Biosafety
Level 3 facility at Plum Is.
Animal Disease Center, N.Y.
$385 million to update of
ARS and APHIS facilities in
Ames, Iowa. 
$106 million for planning
and design of an ARS
biocontainment lab poultry
research in Athens, Ga.
$9.0 million for renovation of
the  An ima l  D i sease
Laboratory in Laramie,
Wyoming
$20 million for expansion of
the Biosensor Technologies





S.1765 (Frist)/  H.R.3310
(Ganske)
S.1563 (Hutchison) H.R.3198 (Putnam) H.R.3293 (Lucas)
Support for Research
Authorizes, for each year (FY
2003-2011), 
$177 million for research in
support of bioterrorism
response initiatives.
$57 million for joint research
initiatives between ARS,
universities and industry on
bioterrorism.
$25 million for competitive
grants to universities and
qualified research institutions
for research on bioterrorism.
(Total $2.3 billion between
FY2003-2011)
Authorizes $20 million in
FY2002, and such sums as
necessary in subsequent
years, for grants to land grant
universities’ biosecurity
needs assessments (see
Biosecurity and Standards in
first section). 
Authorizes $140 million for
each of fiscal years 2003
through 2007 for expanding
ARS research programs to
respond and mitigate
agroterrorism threats, and
strengthen the capacity of
USDA regulatory agencies
(e.g., APHIS, FSIS);
Authorizes $50 million for
each of fiscal years 2003
through 2007 for creating a
“ C o n s o r t i u m  f o r
Countermeasures Against
Agricultural Bioterrorism” to
help form stable long-term
programs of research,
development, and evaluation
of options to enhance the
b i o s e c u r i t y  o f  U . S .
agriculture.





in CSREES  for plant and
animal disease research.
Calls for improving the
capability to identify, treat
and prevent swine diseases
by creating diagnostic tests
and vaccines needed to
protect U.S. swine industry
from acts of biological
terrorism and diseases, such
as the Nipah virus.
(Authorization amount is not
specified).
Similar to S.1563 except
that, in addition, the bill
authorizes $120 million for
collaborative research with
the Oklahoma City National
Memorial Institute for the
Prevention of Terrorism, the






S.1765 (Frist)/  H.R.3310
(Ganske)





for training and for purchase
of rapid detection field test
kits to be distributed by
USDA to State and local
agencies engaged in










a ‘high-tech agriculture early
warning and emergency
response system’; (c)




Authorizes $140 million per
year (FY2003-2007) for : (a)
to enhance and expand
APHIS’ inspection capacity
at international points of
origin, at ports of entry and
customs; and (b) to adopt
n e w  s t r a t e g i e s  a n d
technologies for dealing with
outbreaks of plant and animal
disease arising from acts of
terrorism.,
Authorizes $140 million per
year (FY2003-2007) to
enhance and expand FSIS’
meat and poultry inspection
capacity, rapid detection, and
adopt new ante-mortem and
post-mortem inspection
techniques.
Calls for the appointment
liaison official between
USDA’s Counter terrorism
Policy Council and the
Homeland Security Office.
Calls for an Interagency
Agricultural Terrorism
Committee to coordinate the
counter terrorism efforts in
agriculture. Committee
agencies would be USDA,
FDA and state departments
o f  a g r i c u l t u r e .
(Authorization amount is not
specified.).
Same as S.  1563   except
that, in addition, the bill
authorizes $10 million for the
purchase of rapid detection
field test kits to be
distributed by USDA to state
and local agencies engaged in






S.1765 (Frist)/  H.R.3310
(Ganske)
S.1563 (Hutchison) H.R.3198 (Putnam) H.R.3293 (Lucas)
Education and  Technology
Transfer
No Provisions USDA shall develop and
implement an ‘Industry-on-
Farm Education’ program to
provide biosecurity education
for  fa rms ,  l ives tock
confinement operations, and
livestock auctions;




testing guidelines for farmers
and producers;
  
No Provisions Establishes a consultative
“Industry Working Group” on
Agricultural Terrorism
Establishes special training
and information programs for
agricultural producers on
counter terrorism measures.
Establishes a database to link
animal and human disease
information systems.
No Provisions
